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Fourth Circuit En Banc Hearing of
Urofsky v. Gilmore
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Hearing of Urofsky v. Gilmore, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (Winter 1999-2000)
<http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v6i3/note1.html>. [**]
On October 25, 1999 the constitutional debate over a Virginia statute
limiting state employees from performing uncensored computer-assisted
research resumed before the United States Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. The case in debate is Urofsky v. Gilmore. The statute affects
all Virginia state employees, who amount to over 100,000 people.
The plaintiffs suing the state are six university professors who allege
that the act unconstitutionally interferes with their research, teaching
and publication responsibilities. The plaintiffs, represented by Acting
American
Civil
Liberties
Union ("ACLU") Attorney Marjorie Heins asked for this rehearing after two
previous decisions. The district court in Alexandria first heard
the case and found for the plaintiffs. The Commonwealth then
appealed and the case was heard in front of a three-judge panel of
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, that decision reversed the
district court and held for the Commonwealth. The plaintiffs then filed
for this rehearing before the full court. The court granted that petition
and arguments commenced on October 25, 1999.
The plaintiffs include Melvin Urofsky, a professor at Virginia
Commonwealth University and now a
University of Richmond School of Law
adjunct professor, in Richmond, Virginia, who
states that he was reluctant to assign
students online research assignments on
federal "indecency" law. Bernard Levin
and Brian Delaney are professors of
psychology and literature at Blue Ridge
Community College. They use the Internetfor
teaching and research of the human sexual
experience, including Freudian theories,
concepts of stages of development, and
penis envy. Other plaintiffs are Terry
L. Meyers, an expert on Victorian poets, Paul Smith who taught a
class on how pornography shapes gender roles and sexual identity
in our culture at George Mason University, in Fairfax, Virginia,
and Dana Heller, a professor at Old Dominion University, in
Norfolk, Virginia, whose field of study includes lesbian and gay
studies. The plaintiffs in the case are backed by The American
Association of University Professors, The Thomas Jefferson Center for the
Protection of Free Expression, and The Authors Guild.
The defendant is Governor James Gilmore, of the Commonwealth of
Virginia. The Office of the Attorney General represents the
Commonwealth of Virginia in lawsuits, such as this one. The Solicitor
General, William Hurd, argued this case for the state.
The professors are contesting Virginia Code Section 2.1-805 (the "Act"),
which states, "except to the extent required in conjunction with a bona
fide, agency-approved research project or other agency-approved
undertaking, no agency employee shall utilize agency-owned or agency-
leased computer equipment to access, download, print or store any
information infrastructure files or services having sexually explicit
content." The statute also defines "sexually explicit" content in section
2.1-804, as: "content having as its dominant theme (i) any lascivious
description of or (ii) any lascivious picture, photograph, drawing,
motion picture film, digital image or similar visual representation
depicting sexual bestiality, a lewd exhibition of nudity, as nudity is
defined in section 18.2-390, sexual excitement, sexual conduct or
sadomasochistic abuse, as also defined in section 18.2-390, copraphilia,
urophilia, or fetishism."
This year, the Virginia General Assembly amended the 1996 "sexually
explicit" definition after the district court in Alexandria, Virginia
sided with the plaintiffs. They added the following words: "content
having as its dominate theme...any lascivious description of or (ii) any
lascivious picture..." to the prior definition. Attorney General Hurd
stated that Virginia had always interpreted the statute this way, and
after the decision, he encouraged the General Assembly to make the
textual adjustment to reflect that longstanding intent. Although the
prior definition of sexual content was at issue in the district court
proceedings, the plaintiffs contend that their free speech rights
continue to be infringed even under the amended Act.
The term "lascivious" was defined by the Virginia Supreme Court in the
1979 case Penderson v. City of Richmond[1], to mean, "a state of mind
that is eager for sexual indulgence, desirous of inciting to lust or of
inciting sexual desire and appetite." Additionally, the court held that
"lewd" is synonymous with "lascivious" and "indecent."
The Virginia statute creates a situation in which any state employee who
needs to access this type of information on the Internet must receive
prior written approval from his respective agency head. The details of
the approval are then available to the general public through the Freedom
of Information Act, Va. Code § 2.1-340 et seq. ("FOIA"), so that the
public can observe and examine what the employee is accessing.
The professors complain in the brief to the court[2] that they do not
even know what or which communications on sexually explicit
subjects violate the Act. Some university officials gave their
professor employees blanket approvals for any research. But, a
University of Virginia administrator explained that she would only
approve exceptions on a case-by-case basis.
"The truly significant thing about this case is that the Act is so very
limited in what it applies to, number one, it only applies to state
employees who are using state-owned computers and number two it provides
for the very same kind of work-related exception that the plaintiffs were
saying that they needed, " Hurd said. "Perhaps what they were concerned
about was that they as academics were being required to consult with
their institutions about what they really needed, and for whatever reason
they disdained having to be subject to that kind of institutional
oversight," he added.
The plaintiffs in this case did not seek prior approval from their agency
heads for researching potentially sexually explicit material online. They
also have not shown that a request would have been rejected, had they
submitted. They say that this licensing requirement undermines their
intellectual autonomy and is similar to receiving permission before
getting books from the library. The plaintiffs claim that the statute is
unduly vague both in its definition of what is banned, as well as in the
standards for approval.
Another constitutional argument the plaintiffs made is centered around
academic freedom for university professors. Academic freedom is the right
of teachers and researchers to investigate fields of knowledge and to
express views without fear of restraint or dismissal. "Academic freedom
was a footnote kind of concern in the District Courts opinion, after the
panel opinion the plaintiffs filed petition for rehearing that focused
heavily on the Academic Freedom and broke out the research and
publication part of the argument from the curriculum part," Hurd stated.
According to the Commonwealth, the professors are not all so innocent in
their claim of ignorance of lascivious materials, as the Commonwealth
asserts in its brief submitted to the federal district court. The
Commonwealth points out that Paul Smith, a professor at George Mason
University, in Fairfax, Virginia, created a website with a George Mason
University URL address, on which there were pictures of a naked man in
bondage, the bare buttocks of a woman whose hands were chained and locked
behind her, and other similar pictures - all without any explanatory
text. Many students and faculty complained and the website was eventually
censored as a result of the Act.
The plaintiffs explain that this website was a personal site, and that it
was under construction, but that it is just one example of how the Act
chills the professors' free speech. They point out that Professor Smith
is internationally recognized for his longstanding academic interest in
the cultural ramifications of pornographic imagery, in defense of the
motivations and intentions behind the page's construction.
The plaintiffs filed suit on May 8, 1997, stating that the statute
violates First Amendment rights of state employees and is
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. In February 1998,
they won the case without going to trial, as the district
court judge awarded the plaintiffs with summary judgment.
The Commonwealth appealed and the two judges writing the majority
opinion for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Urofsky v.
Gilmore [3], reversed the district court, finding that the
professors' speech, including researching and publishing of
information on state-owned computers did not constitute a "matter of
public concern," and therefore, was not protected by the First Amendment.
The plaintiffs then filed for a rehearing and the full court
granted the motion. The main issue, as stated by the plaintiffs,
is whether state-employed academics and other professionals
engaged in such intellectual inquiry possess First Amendment
rights to write, publish, engage in research, and exchange information
with colleagues and the public.
In order to find a First Amendment violation, the item published or
"spoken" by the government employee must be a matter of public concern.
Then, the court balances the interests of the employee, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern with the interests of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees. There are
many factors weighed in this determination, as discussed by the
United States Supreme Court in the 1983 case, Connick v.
Myers[4]. The Connick Court required an evaluation of the
"content, form, and context of the statement as revealed by the whole
record" to determine if the speech met the public concern standard. Hurd
added, "the Fourth Circuit has said that if, in context, the speaker
speaks primarily as his role as an employee it is by definition not a
matter of public concern, even though it is something very interesting."
The Commonwealth stated in their brief to the Fourth Circuit that, "the
plaintiffs are manifestly confused about what constitutes government
speech." The Commonwealth accuses the professors not only of overstating
what the Commonwealth considers government speech but also of
understating what the case law shows to be included in this category.
Specifically, when a government employee speaks in order to perform the
duties he was hired to perform, that is government speech and subject to
government supervision, explains the Attorney General. "But, contrary to
how plaintiffs mischaracterize the Commonwealth's position, when an
employee speaks, not to do his job, but to speak about his job, or about
the agency that hired him, that is either citizen speech or employee
speech, depending on whether or not it addresses a matter of public
concern," the Commonwealth wrote.[5]
If the statute is deemed unconstitutional it will not carve out an
exemption for just academic state-employees, but it will be deemed
unconstitutional for all Virginia state employees. Solicitor General Hurd
said that the statute is necessary for the state to exert control over
its employees. But, "Virginia can control its employees' actions without
violating its citizens' rights", opposing counsel Heins said in defense.
Solicitor General Hurd, as appellant, elegantly answered questions
first during the oral arguments in front of the twelve judges. The
judges focused in their questioning on what type of control the state has
over employees and their access to information. Chief Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson, III, inquired as to the state's ability to limit use to
whomever they want. Chief Judge Wilkinson asked, as an example, can the
state disallow AIDS research on hospital-owned computers? Hurd answered
the inquiry by responding that the state can control computers just as it
controls any other resource.
Some of the questions were presumably for the purpose of gathering
information as to the actual effect of this legislation on the
professors. Judge Diana Gribbon Motz asked Hurd about the nature of the
actual process of obtaining access to the materials. Hurd answered that
if the employee is researching anything in the library and any of these
materials is germane to his research, he only needs prior permission to
obtain access.
During the ACLU's argument, the judges were tough in assessing whether
the professors had suffered any real damages. Chief Judge Wilkinson, at
one point, interrupted Heins' bellicose argument to ask if this conduct
at issue was really discrimination, since the statute was uniformly
applied to all employees, from those conducting medical research as well
as those in legal research or art studies. Heins answered that the
Virginia statute created content discrimination when it directly
interfered with the primary research tool - online browsing - for
thousands of state employees.
Judge J. Michael Luttig interjected that the public might want to know
what kind of smut professors are accessing in their roles as professors,
so the professors should, in turn, be required to obtain agency head
approval before accessing that information. Chief Judge Wilkinson pointed
out that there is a real problem for the state as an employer in
controlling access to sexual materials which disturb the working
environment and harass other employees. Heins responded that the state
already had a statute that controlled all state-owned property, and
subsequently they singled out the Internet when there was no need to do
so. Heins stated afterwards that, "Judge Luttig throws this very
subjective disapproval of smut into the mix but the statute applies to
very specific content and to professors who are researching subjects such
as history and art and there is plenty of research material that wouldn't
be categorized as smut. And what is lascivious is anyone's guess."
The Chief Judge also wanted to know if in practical terms anyone's free
speech was being denied. Heins responded that several professors have
been affected in such a limiting manner by the statute. She pointed out
that even her opposing counsel, Hurd, was required to request from his
agency head approval for access when he was researching this lawsuit. The
Chief Judge then asked if the court should wait to decide these issues in
a suit where there was a clear-cut denial of access and a better
situation to claim a chilling of speech. The ACLU response was negative,
that the court should not wait. "In this area of research and
communication the extraction and distribution of ideas in an academic
environment of which the Internet is the primary medium, there is a high
threshold in favor of no restrictions," Heins stated.
Both sides said they are guardedly hopeful for the outcome of the full
court's opinion to fall on their side. Heins added that a number of the
Fourth Circuit judges seemed to understand that the panel decision was
not right, at least with regard to research and publication. The full
court's decision is expected in the next few months. Beyond that, the
final step is the United States Supreme Court, should the non-prevailing
party ultimately decides to appeal.
The Commonwealth is certainly not finished defending its Internet
statutes. In October 1999, the Commonwealth of Virginia was sued on
claims of violating the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.[6] The plaintiffs[7]
claim that Virginia's legislature is attempting to reduce all Internet
content to a level deemed suitable for juveniles, and to criminalize all
electronic files or messages that could be considered harmful to those
juveniles. The statute attacked in this lawsuit is Virginia Code Section
18.2-391 (the "Act"). The Act bars the "knowing display" of material
deemed "harmful to juveniles," if the display is "for [a] commercial
purpose [and] in a manner whereby juveniles may examine or peruse" the
materials. The statute does not provide any exemptions or affirmative
defenses, and includes "electronic file or message" in the list of
prohibited materials reached by the law.
The plaintiffs allege that the Act bans constitutionally-protected speech
by and to adults. Any violation of the Act is a Class One misdemeanor,
punishable by "confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a
fine of not more than $2,500, either or both."[8] The plaintiffs in the
lawsuit include Internet service providers ("ISPs"), businesses that
provide Internet connections, non-profit organizations, magazine and book
publishers, educational sites, authors and other diverse groups.
The Fourth Circuit seems to favor limiting access to the Internet when
that access includes research topics that the court finds to be
lascivious in nature, as in the Urofsky case. It will interesting to see
if this same rationale holds true when the court decides the newest case
involving exposure so similar materials over the Internet to juveniles.
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